The Cosmopolitan Agenda: Constitutive Features and Metaethical Implications

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The language of global civility and of prescriptivist global rules often carries a whiff of paternalistic imperialism and can raise hackles, especially among writers and researchers with postcolonial sympathies. Engaging such issues is an objective of this paper on cosmopolitanism, the second in a series of three papers being written to coincide with the start of our new Global Studies Program within SLAS to provide interdisciplinary overviews of some key concepts in global studies (globalisation, cosmopolitanism, and posthumanism, respectively) and to explore the relevance of literature and other signifying cultural practices in articulating these. After arguing, against Ulrich Beck and proponents of a descriptive approach to cosmopolitanism, that normativity is a distinguishing feature of any substantive theory of cosmopolitanism, this paper surveys works by influential recent theorists of cosmopolitanism, including Martha Nussbaum, Seyla Benhabib, and Kwame Anthony Appiah, with a view to unpacking shared features, discussing responses to criticism, and highlighting metaethical assumptions. Such cosmopolitan thought is seen to share a certain 'natural law' perspective, though this may not be explicitly acknowledged. A tentative defence of this natural law perspective is offered, drawing on Hilary Putnam's work on fact/value entanglement and Jonathan Crowe's view of natural law as grounded in a historically and socially situated human nature.

1. Cosmopolitanism: a heuristic map of the field

The starting point for discussions of cosmopolitanism is global connectivity, typically imagined as connections between (human) people. The cosmopolitanism emerging from this connectivity can be a phenomenon to be described, for example in the spread of certain lifestyles and practices of communication and consumption labelled as "cosmopolitan"; or it can be a normative project, in which the idea of world citizenship, of being a *kosmopolites*, inscribes a set of obligations owed by each of us to our fellow (human) planetary cohabitants given fresh urgency by conditions of heightened connectivity under globalisation. Theorists of cosmopolitanism argue that global connectivity decentres the nation-state both as a location of personal identity and as the supreme institutional actor determining legal and political responses to global challenges, managing worldwide economic activity, and adjudicating issues of global justice. Since this connectivity is seen as adumbrating new solidarities to replace or at least supplement those of the nation, theorists of cultural cosmopolitanism are concerned, for example, with how transnational networks and mobilities, intercultural communication and exchange act to shape such identities. These cosmopolitan solidarities are accompanied by new obligations in terms of justice as well as new legal and political institutional structures for their implementation. In this regard, theorists of normative cosmopolitanism look to identify the principles underlying and duties arising from a commitment to shared human dignity and human rights and ask to whom these duties are assigned; meanwhile, theorists of legal and political cosmopolitanism focus on systems of global governance and how cosmopolitan principles are debated, juridified, and enforced.[1]

[1] The literature on cosmopolitanism is extensive and growing; a subset of influential work is referenced in the relevant sections below. Fuller overviews as well as a sense of the diversity of the field are provided by the editorial introductions

When mapping the now crowded field of research on cosmopolitanism, it is helpful to start from the is/ought distinction alluded to above. On the one hand, there are "descriptive" approaches that see cosmopolitanism as something that people actually do; researchers, therefore, explore forms of sociocultural life and practice in terms of cosmopolitanism, seeking to identify features that may be described as cosmopolitan and to explain the relevance of cosmopolitanism in understanding and categorising these. On the other hand, there are more "normative" approaches that see cosmopolitanism as something people ought to do; here, researchers look to establish the cosmopolitan principles that should inform and regulate people's interactions with cultural others, or they consider how our lives and institutions can be better organised to reflect such ideals. Although it will be argued that this distinction does hold up to sustained scrutiny, it is a useful jumping-off point that retains value for heuristic purposes.[2]

2. Descriptive approaches to cosmopolitanism

The voice of sociologist Ulrich Beck has been influential among practitioners of "descriptive" approaches to cosmopolitanism. Beck (Cosmopolitan Vision) defines the current era as a "Second Modernity" characterised by a new reflexive awareness of the anthropogenic risks accompanying global interconnectivity. Interconnectivity generates shared risks – environmental, epidemiological, financial, technological, terroristic – that cannot be solved or avoided by nation-states or individuals acting alone. Beck argues that global risks create a global public and ground a cosmopolitan imaginary: the imperative of a cosmopolitan response to such risks – as he puts it, the "cosmopolitan imperative: cooperate or fail!" (Cosmopolitan Sociology 20). It is this imperative that Beck sees driving new forms of social solidarity and community-building that undermine the primacy of the nation-state. He dubs this empirically-observed "civilizational process" of new solidaristic attachments emerging from the reflexive consideration of shared global risk "(reflexive) cosmopolitanization", and insists that it requires a shift of research paradigm: replacing the methodological focus on the nation-state as the basic unit for analysis with a paradigm that is more attentive to transnational dynamics and networks; this does not mean ignoring the continuing relevance of the national but rather "embedding" it in other processes and structures that operate outside or are imperfectly congruent with the boundaries and spaces of the nation (26-28).

Rovisco and Nowicka (Ashgate Companion) point out how researchers in the fields of sociology, anthropology and cultural studies have responded to Beck's call with a wealth of studies investigating the "grounded" cosmopolitanism exemplified in the situated, material practices of migrants and diaspora communities, among the inhabitants of culturally diverse metropolitan centres, or within transnational networks of global activists. Their *Ashgate Research Companion to Cosmopolitanism* includes contributions examining consumption practices, identity formation, and cultural mixing in specific transnational contexts, considering the extent and content of the cosmopolitanism these embody. Roche, for example, looks at how 19th-century Expos combined both "proto-cosmopolitan" elements, through their proselytising of the universalist and progressive ideals of modernism and their promotion of intercultural communication through tourism, together with "anti-cosmopolitan" elements through their implicit nationalism and glorification of Empire (Mega-Events and Cosmopolitanism). Horvath (The Cosmopolitan City) examines urban branding strategies in Paris compared with London, noting how the term "cosmopolitan" has largely been preferred to "multicultural" in promoting Paris as a metropolitan centre and migrant destination, and exploring the connection between this preference and Republican discourses of integration through assimilation. Dharwadkher (Diaspora and Cosmopolitanism)

and contributions to Brown and Held (Cosmopolitan Reader), Rovisco and Nowicka (Ashgate Companion), and Delanty (Routledge Cosmopolitanism Studies).

[2] This way of "bisecting" the field is used by Rovisco and Nowicka (Ashgate Companion); other ways of mapping cosmopolitanisms can be found in Vertovec and Cohen (Conceiving Cosmopolitanism), Brown and Held (Cosmopolitan Reader), Van Hooft (Cosmopolitanism), and Skrbis and Woodward (Cosmopolitanism: Uses of the Idea).

investigates the Jewish and Indian diasporas to question a widely-held view of diaspora populations as inherently cosmopolitan, arguing that this is sensitive to the degree of creolisation that has taken place. For Dharwadkher, cosmopolitans are defined by their "cultural ambidexterity"—their ability to "code switch" between cultures at will, maintaining "critical distance" from each and so able to be at home in either. By contrast, the creole subject inhabits a hybrid culture (distinct, just as a creolised language is distinct from those of which it is an "admixture"), making code-switching problematic. Dharwadkher links this competence to the ability to assimilate, concluding that a cosmopolitan identity is unattainable for diaspora subjects unable to assimilate into both host and homeland cultures. Meanwhile, chapters by Skrbis and Woodward (Cosmopolitan Openness) and by Germann Molz (Cosmopolitanism and Consumption) focus on the link between cosmopolitanism and consumption, asking whether politically- and ethically-aware consumption that is "authentic" or fully "reflexive" in its commitment to cosmopolitan principles is possible. Skrbis and Woodford treat this question in much greater detail in their book on cosmopolitanism (Cosmopolitanism: Uses of the Idea). Extending Appadurai's notion of "-scapes" for conceptualizing global cultural flows, they coin the term "cosmoscape" to describe the "spaces, practices, objects and images" that facilitate the emergence of cosmopolitanism (55). They cite work on metropolitan spaces and cultural festivals that promote "cosmopolitan civility" while noting that the success of such projects is highly dependent on the interpretative frameworks within which they are encountered. Exposure to other cultures through travel, music, fashion, literature, visual media, cuisine, and workplace diversity may act as spurs to the development of a cosmopolitan sensibility, but this outcome cannot be guaranteed (chapters 5 and 6).

Accompanying this excavation of grounded practices of cosmopolitanism is a broadly postcolonial concern with the plurality of cosmopolitan identities and how these are shaped by historically and culturally contingent contexts. Despite its inclusive premises, cosmopolitanism is accused of a Western philosophical normative idealism that privileges the experiences and outlook of a highly mobile global elite and is liable in practice to deployment for exclusionary purposes. In response, there have been efforts both to include more non-Western and "vernacular" cosmopolitan practices and to attend to the ways in which cosmopolitanism may be coopted to entrench existing structures of domination.[3] From the latter perspective, Germann Molz traces how sociologists and cultural theorists have seen cosmopolitanism as a cultural attitude and set of navigational competencies closely linked to habits of consumption: from Hannerz's "delight in difference" allied with both the willingness and skills to engage with other cultures, through the mobility, curiosity and reflexivity that characterize Urry's "aesthetic cosmopolitanism", the "mundane cosmopolitanism" which Hebdige sees in practices of TV consumption, and the "banal" forms of everyday cosmopolitanism noted by Beck and exemplified in culinary eclecticism or the experience of shopping in department stores (Germann Molz 35-37). Yet the postcolonial concern here is with the impact of this satisfaction of cosmopolitan appetite on the diversity it purports to value. Germann Molz quotes bell hooks on the operation of a "consumer cannibalism" that eradicates difference through a process of commodification that is both homogenizing and deracinated (38). Similarly, displays of culturally/aesthetically omnivorous consumption may be used as a "strategy of exclusion" to demonstrate financial and educational wherewithal and to signal difference from the less mobile poor (41-42). A vivid example of this process is provided by Skrbis and Woodford (Cosmopolitanism: Uses of the Idea) who cite studies showing how cosmopolitan tropes of hospitality, cultural eclecticism and global mobility are employed in the production and consumption of "aeromobility" in hub airports such as Dubai, Changi, and Abu Dhabi to package the sale of aircraft tickets into the purchase of an elite identity. Although generally optimistic about the transformative potential of cosmopolitan consumption, in this case they acknowledge how it has become coopted by the interests of capital to become an example of "cultural appropriation operationalized by a fantasy of engaging with difference" (66-67). Far from awakening "reflexive" cosmopolitan sensibilities, such examples of "soft"

[3] See, for example, David Harvey (Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom) or the contributions to part IV of Delanty (Routledge Cosmopolitanism Studies).

cosmopolitan consumption may serve simply to further insulate the consumer from the material conditions of their production.

Alert to such problems, Skrbis and Woodford define the "openness" that for them is the central component of cosmopolitanism to include not only physical and cultural mobility and the competencies to navigate other cultures, but also an "unswerving ethical component" that springs from a "reflexive relationship to difference, refracted through global dimensions of belonging and the embrace of otherness" (14-16). At the same time, they also seek to be more inclusive about who and what may be considered cosmopolitan: they evince hostility to the creation of a hierarchy of deep/shallow cosmopolitan practices and claim to have stepped back from past work in which they sought to specify the dispositional characteristics of the cosmopolitan with a view to measuring the extent to which someone could be considered to belong to this social category. Instead, they valorise the "ordinary cosmopolitanism" of everyday encounters with difference in neighbourhoods, workplaces, and practices of omnivorous consumption, and they think of cosmopolitan identity not in absolute terms (either one is or is not cosmopolitan) but as a "dispositional repertoire" of situated strategies for coping with otherness and conceiving belonging which are performed in contingent circumstances and can therefore be articulated in different, potentially inconsistent ways (25-27, 108-111).

This descriptive focus on embodied lives and material practices is a welcome corrective to the abstractions that characterise some philosophical cosmopolitan musings, but the eagerness to disavow the normative is bought at the cost of conceptual clarity and analytical precision. Beck insists that his "cosmopolitanization" is an observed sociological process rooted in global interconnectivity rather than a philosophy derived from abstract principles about human autonomy or world citizenship (Cosmopolitan Sociology 20; Cosmopolitan Vision 19-20, 48), yet in doing so he blurs the distinction between "cosmopolitan" responses to the conditions of the global risk society ("cooperate or fail") and other kinds of response, in particular the political realist response in which solutions to global problems are sought on the basis of self-interest and coercion. Annexation and domination, the leveraging of power to maximise the share of resources accruing to one's in-group at the expense of others, are alternative responses to interconnectivity that may be successful strategies for promoting national interests over long horizons. Beck's concern for global inequality and criticism of the exclusionary lens of the nation-state evidently spring from a cosmopolitan interest in the welfare of non-national others, but it is not clear how this is motivated in an analysis that eschews the normative. Much the same criticism can be levelled at Skrbis and Woodford, whose well-intentioned refusal to endorse distinctions in the literature between "deep" and "shallow" cosmopolitanism as being hierarchical is patently at odds with their valorisation of reflexive cosmopolitan sensibilities that include an ethical component with a global dimension. In both cases, a virtue has been made of empirical over normative grounding (the "is" over the "ought") while normativity has snuck quietly in via the back door. This is not surprising since what distinguishes cosmopolitanism from other theories for responding to globality is precisely its normative content. Rather than downplaying this normativity, it is important to acknowledge and explain the commitments being made, as well as the problems that attend them.

3. Normative approaches to cosmopolitanism

This brings us back to the idea of cosmopolitanism as world citizenship, in which membership of a world community is seen as imposing reciprocal obligations (potentially both negative and positive duties) on members of that community. Standard introductions to cosmopolitanism explain it as a philosophy that seeks, for example, the "normative principles [that] should be adopted to help guide future cohabitation on our planet" (Brown and Held, Cosmopolitan Reader 1), or to achieve a "globally valid ethics appealing to norms inherent in humanity" (Van Hooft 2). Underlying this philosophy is a concept of inalienable dignity that grounds the moral equality of people. This dignity is envisaged as belonging to the individual and as binding us, as individuals, into reciprocal relationships of respect: each member of the community, equal in terms of dignity, is under a mutual obligation to recognise and show concern for the moral worth of every other. In line with such thinking, normative theories

of cosmopolitanism[4] generally share three core features: (1) Universalism – the claim that there is a substantive content to what we share as human beings (a shared human nature) which can then be used to ground normative principles, or duties of justice, owed equally to all; as Robert Fine explains, universalism acknowledges the significance of differences between people but considers these as "internal" to the "unity of humankind" and it is this view that informs both cosmopolitanism's "methodological approach to understanding the world and its normative approach to changing the world" (Preface, thesis 2). (2) Ethical individualism – the idea that the proper object of moral concern is the individual; this is often framed in Kantian terms as the idea that moral respect requires each person be treated as an end not a means. As Appiah points out, the implication of ethical individualism is that societies and cultures in themselves are only a matter of concern to the extent that they affect socially and culturally embodied individuals. This does not rule out a pluralistic concern for identity groups or the possibility of group rights, but it does reject a "homology between identity groups and persons" as objects of respect and thus subordinates the protection of group autonomy to the protection of individual well-being (Ethics of Identity ix, 72-79). (3) A broadly "natural law" perspective that sees moral principles grounded in shared human nature and circumstances (including a shared appreciation of intrinsic goods, implying common values) as both generating and validating social forms of law. Though recent theorists of cosmopolitanism often distance themselves from the Kantian metaphysics of the disembodied self-legislating subject utilising reason to discern *a priori* natural laws that bind actions even in the absence of positive legislation, a natural law perspective tends to remain operative at some level, even if not fully acknowledged.[5]

3.1 Nussbaum on the Cosmopolitan Tradition and her own Capabilities Approach

Perhaps the best-known contemporary philosophical theorist of cosmopolitanism is Martha Nussbaum, whose Capabilities Approach illustrates all the above features and provides a helpful benchmark with which to assess problems and to consider how these may be mitigated by alternative attempts to theorize cosmopolitan normative principles. Nussbaum has traced the evolution of a western "cosmopolitan tradition" which has been influential in conceptualizing the principles of world citizenship, with a view not only to rehearsing its insights but also to exposing its flaws; her Capabilities Approach aims to build on the former while seeking to address the latter

[4] The discussion here draws on Brown and Held (Cosmopolitan Reader), Van Hooft (Cosmopolitanism), Fine (Cosmopolitanism), Nussbaum (Cosmopolitan Tradition; Kant and Cosmopolitanism; Creating Capabilities), Benhabib (Another Cosmopolitanism; Rights of Others) and Appiah (Ethics of Identity; Cosmopolitanism).

[5] Fine, for example, notes the submerged natural law content at work in the universal principles of constitutional patriotism that underpin Jurgen Habermas' cosmopolitanism: "While patriotism in general requires obedience to the law of the land, constitutional patriotism distinguishes between what is law and what is right and mandates that all positive law be evaluated in the light of the universal precepts embodied in the constitution. The principles of the constitution stand in for natural law. The critical content of constitutional patriotism is the principle that the state can expect obedience to its law only if it rests on principles worthy of recognition" (45). Interestingly, Fine distinguishes his own "cosmopolitan social theory" from other theories of cosmopolitanism by explicitly abjuring natural law in favour of political praxis: his cosmopolitanism is a social form of right, "neither an artefact of nature (as is imagined by natural law theory) nor a mere construction of the state (as is imagined in legal positivism)", but a contingent and "precarious" achievement of modern politics that must continue to be struggled for (133). Yet in endorsing an Arendtian "right to have rights" that is "transformative" of existing political institutions and legal arrangements (Preface: theses 11, 12 and 16), as well as the notion of a "reflective judgement" that can distinguish right from wrong "without the guidance of fixed rules" and approach the Arendtian "enlarged mentality" of seeing matters from the universalized perspective of a world citizen (124-7), Fine seems to have retained significant elements of natural law thinking. As in Benhabib (discussed below), natural law provides a deeply embedded (if weakly acknowledged) grounding for the transformative politics that is envisaged.

(Cosmopolitan Tradition).

As with the more culturally ecumenical UDHR, this cosmopolitan tradition is built around a core notion of dignity, with which humans are equally endowed and which is linked to the capacities for reason and moral choice (the exercise of "conscience" in dealing with others). The tradition is generally seen starting with the colourful lifestyle of Diogenes the Cynic which, characterized by frugality and the deliberate flaunting of conventional cultural and sexual mores, involved an explicit rejection of the politics and values of class and local polis in favour of shared belonging as a *kosmopolites*: dignity for Diogenes lay in his moral capacity to choose to live in accordance with his understanding of the dictates of shared human nature; seeing such dignity as inalienable, all Diogenes required from Alexander the Great was to be left alone to exercise it in peace.[6] The Stoics then infuse a flavour of natural religion into their notion of *dignitas*, in which dignity is linked to reason as "the portion of the divine in each of us" and hence to the possession of a soul—something which everyone possesses equally (Cosmopolitan Tradition 2, 69-70, 74; Kant and Cosmopolitanism 30). Allied to this is the Stoic insistence that *eudaimonia* (human flourishing) is secured not from material circumstances but through a well-lived life, glossed as one which is lived in conformity with "nature's moral law", prior to positive law and discernible to our common reason (Cosmopolitan Tradition 26-29, 34-39). Particularistic attachments tend to be viewed negatively (Nussbaum notes Cicero as a qualified exception), as a type of passional attachment to externals wisely abjured by the enlightened Stoic: the contingencies of immediate circumstance (nationality, race, status, fortune) do not touch dignity and are hence "morally irrelevant" (53); meanwhile, the inevitable partiality of passional attachments tends to occlude a cosmopolitan understanding of the duties owed to humanity as a whole (52-53, 75-78, 92-94). These duties of justice, springing from the obligation not to violate innate dignity, hold across national boundaries and impose moral restrictions on acceptable conduct in war, the treatment of enemies, and respect for property even in the absence of positive law (29). Reason is seen drawing people together in an ordered social and political life bound by natural law: in the words of Marcus Aurelius, "If reason is common, so too is law; and if this is common, then we are fellow citizens. If this is so, we share in a kind of organized polity. And if that is so, the world is at it were a city-state" (M. Aur. Med. IV.4; qtd by Nussbaum, ibid., 75). Grotius, in *On the Law of War and Peace* (1645), similarly insists that international relations should be governed not just by force and self-interest, but by moral norms derivable from humans' "rational and social nature"—the norms of a *ius naturale* which may be codified and become enforceable in given national or religious contexts as positive laws, but whose existence and validity is independent of such endorsement, even by the ultimate authority of a divine creator.[7] It is a relatively short step to Kant's concern with establishing, by a priori reasoning, the political and legal foundations for achieving conditions of universal cosmopolitan justice, understood as those in which each morally autonomous individual would enjoy the greatest possible freedom that can coexist with like freedom for all others. Here, a Stoic-inflected concept of dignity grounds the republican precepts of a constitution through which citizens, exercising their right to public reason, are envisaged as co-legislators of the laws that bind them; the internationalization of such a social contract, mediated by mutually respectful sovereign (republican) nations answerable to their subjects and assenting to a cosmopolitan "right of hospitality" (restricting the permissible treatment of arriving strangers) motivated by the boundedness and "common ownership" of the Earth, is seen by Kant as leading eventually to perpetual peace and the providential fulfilment of human potential (Perpetual Peace).[8]

For Nussbaum, the figure of Diogenes captures two related problems that come to haunt the cosmopolitan

[6] See Nussbaum's discussion of Diogenes and his request that Alexander "get out of my light" (Cosmopolitan Tradition 1, 4-5, 66ff).

[7] See Nussbaum chapter 4 on Grotius; 103f on the *etiamsi daremus* argument sketched out here.

[8] See also discussions in Brown (Kant's Cosmopolitanism), Fine (Cosmopolitanism), Benhabib (Rights of Others), and Nussbaum (Kant and Cosmopolitanism).

tradition as it was developed by ancient and modern philosophers alike. The first, which she terms the "motivational problem", refers to the moral psychology of cosmopolitanism: does a shared capacity for moral reason provide sufficient psychological motivation to bind a community with a sense of common obligations, and what place does it allow for the particular attachments of kith and kin that typically motivate such obligations? For Stoics like Marcus Aurelius, such local ties to friends and family are a means to a cosmopolitan end: a way of understanding and achieving the duties owed to humanity as a whole. Nussbaum glosses the Stoic idea of concentric circles of affiliation as a "device of moral education" – encouraging people to extend the sense of attachment they feel locally outwards to encompass more distant others, while "delegating" general duties owed to humanity through the performance of local obligations, promoting the global good through local action (77-78). Yet, as she points out, a more psychologically "convincing" cosmopolitanism must recognize the claims of emotion as well as those of reason, and particular attachments as well as the love of humanity (96). Appiah is similarly scathing about the "ruthless cosmopolitanism" of, for example, William Godwin, that abjures all special obligations in its insistence on the moral equality of all persons: "most of us find the smell of burning friends and relations distinctly off-putting" (Ethics of Identity 220-223). The second problem raised by the figure of Diogenes is his dismissive attitude towards externals, the same disjunction between dignity and material circumstances that goes on to characterize much Stoic writing on *eudaimonia*. A flourishing life spent exercising rational moral choice is seen as independent of situation. It is this disjunction that Nussbaum observes driving, for example in Cicero, the restriction of cosmopolitan duties of justice (*iustitia*) to negative duties; positive duties to distant others, for example the provision of material aid, are classed as beneficence (*beneficentia*)—admirable actions certainly, but at best "imperfect" obligations: it is unclear to whom they should be assigned and to what extent they must be fulfilled (30-33, 54-62). This "bifurcation" of the duties of justice and beneficence, together with the overly restrictive and inconsistent idea of human flourishing that lies behind it, is seen by Nussbaum as a key flaw in the cosmopolitan tradition that her Capabilities Approach seeks to address.

So how does Nussbaum address these two deeply embedded flaws? Dealing with the first requires finding a theory of moral motivation that is inclusive of distant others while not requiring the renunciation of "thick" ties of kinship and concern that not only provide the affective spurs to ethical action but are also sources of joy and human flourishing in themselves. Here, Nussbaum takes her cue from Cicero, who admits the existence of duties of beneficence (albeit imperfect) to those with whom we are situated in relationships of thick fellowship—not just the mutual dependency of family and neighbours, but also the mutual accountability for laws and civic institutions shared by members of a republic (54-62). Nussbaum notes how Cicero's valorisation of the virtues of friendship and love of republic evince a recognition that such "externals" nevertheless have intrinsic value and are appropriate "objects of devotion" in themselves (90-91; 210). Building on this insight, she also affirms Grotius' view of the moral salience of the nation as the "primary locus of human self-expression and autonomy" (139); this, allied with the nation's practical significance as a site for realizing duties of justice and material redistribution, demands respect for nation-state sovereignty in the codification of principles of moral (natural) law in both national and international legislation. Yet respect for sovereignty comes tempered by Grotius' insistence on the "cosmic city" as a "moral realm" and not simply a political and legal structure (219). In this cosmic city, human beings live subject to a moral law that exerts its authority indirectly via the positive laws of the sovereign nations in which they are situated and to which, as social beings living in cooperation with others, they have partly ceded their autonomy. That autonomy is only ever partly ceded because dignity is inalienable, so the permissible actions of sovereign nations continue to be constrained by moral law (chapter 4, passim). Evidently, this sets up a tension between the principles of respect for sovereignty and respect for the moral law that is not easily resolvable. Sensitive to the charge of moral imperialism, Nussbaum notes the need to reconceptualize cosmopolitanism to make it more accommodative of value pluralism and, especially, different religious worldviews. Here, she broadly follows the political liberalism of Rawls— rather than a comprehensive doctrine of the good life, she proposes a basic set of political principles which can be advanced in religiously neutral terms and "embraced by all citizens

who endorse some basic values of equal respect" on the basis of an "overlapping consensus" among different worldviews (214-16). The moral salience of national sovereignty indicates erring on the side of laissez-faire when it comes to cosmopolitan enforcement: Nussbaum sees the weakness of human rights law as "normatively desirable" (14-15; 248-9). Rather than coercion, she favours the work of persuasion through the global public sphere—the generation of transnational solidarity and support for internal change—although forceful intervention is not ruled out in the cases of "genocide, torture and gross crimes against humanity" (220-222; 249).

It is, however, in responding to the second problem, the Stoic-influenced account of dignity that focuses exclusively on the capacity for moral choice and disregards material situation, that Nussbaum's Capabilities Approach offers its most distinctive contribution. She develops a two-tiered position on dignity that she describes as "more Aristotelian than Stoic" (91) in the weight it accords material circumstances in the development of human capabilities necessary for *eudaimonia*. Dignity is founded on the possession of basic (innate) capabilities that include those for action and emotion as well as reason; it is inalienable to the extent that a "sufficient cluster" (76) of these basic capabilities is inalienable. Basic capabilities, however, need to be developed through education and nurture to become "internal capabilities"—the internal capacity for human flourishing given the appropriate external circumstances to do so. To Nussbaum, it is self-evident that the "development of reason, desire and will" can be impaired by external forces (79); in other words, these internal capabilities are alienable in the sense that one can be deprived of them. This is why she needs the two-tiered system to separate the grounds for dignity (and the accompanying moral equality), found in a cluster of basic capabilities, from the object of moral respect—the internal capabilities that the polity ought to nurture.[9] In this expanded account of dignity, Nussbaum draws interestingly on Adam Smith's emphasis, in *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), on the capacity for economic activity as a core feature of human dignity. Smith's conception of dignity grounds a material dimension of justice: material externals, including the enjoyment of property rights in one's labour and a material environment consistent with the exercise of economic agency, become a proper object of moral concern. Smith also stresses the importance of education and basic living standards in the nurturing of innate capabilities, with a role for the state in organizing societies so that workers can actually exercise these capabilities through autonomous action, including freedoms of movement, occupation, and association. Though most famous for his invisible hand rhetoric regarding the guiding power of human self-interest, Smith also saw human beings as social creatures whose attachments to material interests must be tempered by a more traditionally Stoic self-command (the spectatorial perspective of the "man in the breast"), motivated by reciprocal duties of respect. When translated into the international sphere, patriotic attachment to local interests has inherent value in motivating productive and socially beneficial activity, contributing to the wealth of a nation through the efficient and just use of its resources, and thus allowing a fuller development and enjoyment of human potential; however, such patriotic attachment must be similarly tempered by a national self-command that is properly attentive to the reciprocal claims of humanity as a whole.[10] In this way, Nussbaum's cosmopolitanism insists on positive obligations owed to distant others with respect to the material conditions necessary for the active exercise of dignity.

4. Criticism and some more nuanced cosmopolitan responses

Talk of universalism and natural law is often decried as essentialist and imperialist, while ethical individualism is similarly seen as tilting the field against more traditionalist or communitarian worldviews. The normative cosmopolitanism described above, especially in neo-Kantian incarnations seeking to turn cosmopolitan principles with metaphysical underpinnings into internationally binding laws, unsurprisingly generates hostility. The broad charge against cosmopolitanism is that it is inattentive to the claims of culture, and that this failure to situate the

[9] See discussions in chapter 3 (especially 91-91) and chapter 7, where Nussbaum's proposed list of "central human capabilities" is spelled out (240-243).

[10] See Nussbaum (Cosmopolitan Tradition), chapter 5.

knowing, legislating self is its undoing—epistemologically, ethically and politically. Epistemologically, the unencumbered liberal self, conceived as pre-social and self-determining as to its ends, is the target of a Hegelian critique of ahistoricism and insensitivity to the contingencies of cultural context and political contest.[11] Ethically, the emphasis on the autonomous individual is depicted as a Western cultural imposition, one closely shackled to the interests of a neo-imperialistic capitalism in valorising consumer choice and too-easily highjacked for geopolitical purposes.[12] Politically, because it underplays the primacy of local attachments, including those to the nation, in shaping people's identities and securing their assent to coercive institutional arrangements, cosmopolitanism is said to be a flawed foundation for global justice.[13] Allied to these is a neo-Marxist materialist critique that sees the current neoliberal global economic order as systematically rigged to favour richer nations, with the illusion of autonomy (producer and consumer "fetishism") concealing the extent to which existing structures deprive workers and subalterns of control over their conditions of work and its products, and of the means to escape from lives of poverty and injustice.[14] Finally, noting how the cosmopolitan tradition tends to privilege the human as "exceptional" in terms of moral worth, we might append a posthuman critique of the tradition's anthropocentrism and ask whether there is scope for cosmopolitan hospitality to be extended across the species barrier (Nayer). What the above criticisms have in common is a suspicion of claims to universality and the ways these so often mask particular interests, whether consciously or unconsciously. As Nussbaum is the first to admit, the Stoics' blindness towards the institution of slavery, Kant's attitude to women, Grotius' intolerance of homosexuality, and Adam Smith's gendered conception of virtues and dismissive views on the dignity of animals such as "fawning dogs" are all warning examples of how particular values can be mistakenly elevated to the status of universal moral norms (Kant and Cosmopolitanism 34; Cosmopolitan Tradition 125-6, 151, 214-216). Mutterings about essentialism and neo-imperialism cannot be lightly ignored.

Kurasawa (Critical Cosmopolitanism) lays out the challenge facing a cosmopolitanism that seeks to be "critical" in its normative critique of the current world order, in its commitment to material transformation of that order to achieve greater equality and freedom, and in its self-reflexive awareness of the assumptions and biases of the liberal cosmopolitan tradition from which it seeks a critical distance. She holds tightly to the "normative aspirations" that she sees as constitutive of cosmopolitanism: the "world citizenship" aspiration that imagines political membership in global terms; an "ethos of worldliness" (in the Arendtian sense of "enlarged mentality") that is open to difference and aspires to a culturally plural worldview; and a universalistic "belief in human unity" that denies essentialist and exclusionary cultural discourses and aspires to mutual intelligibility even in the face of seemingly incommensurable cultural divides. Crucially, however, Kurasawa argues that these three constitutive normative aspirations must be tempered by a grounded awareness of the obstacles preventing their practical realization, and that a philosophy based on moral equality should also evince a radical commitment to the agonistic processes of achieving that equality (279-280). For her, "Critical Cosmopolitanism" is thus "an ethical orientation [that] requires pursuing arduous processes of intercultural dialogue across apparently intractable global divides, in order to generate a contingent yet egalitarian discourse of universal emancipation informed by

[11] Taylor (Sources of The Self) provides a comprehensive critique from a communitarian perspective. Discussions in Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy) and in Benhabib (Situating the Self) are helpful. Fine (Cosmopolitanism), chapter 2, details Hegel's criticism of Kant's cosmopolitanism.

[12] See, for example, discussions in Benhabib (Situating the Self), Van Hooft (Cosmopolitanism), and Phillips (Multiculturalism without Culture).

[13] Criticism along these lines may be found in the contributions of Nagel, Dahl, Miller, and Kymlicka in Brown and Held (Cosmopolitan Reader).

[14] See, for example, Harvey (Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom), Spivak (Can the Subaltern Speak?), Hardt and Negri (Empire) for related criticism. Appadurai's concept of consumer/producer fetishism in the context of global supply chains is discussed in Germann Molz (Cosmopolitanism and Consumption).

a plurality of understandings of the good and the just" (282).

It is an ambitious goal. So how successfully have contemporary theorists of normative cosmopolitanism responded to this challenge, and particularly to the charge of insensitivity to the claims and material situations of cultural others? For the current purposes, it must suffice to look at a few representative examples of nuanced versions of cosmopolitanism that are more accommodating of cultural roots and discrepant values, as well as less uncompromisingly confident in their own epistemological premises.[15]

As seen above, Nussbaum (Cosmopolitan Tradition) is far from ignoring communitarian and materialist concerns. Her insistence on the moral salience of national sovereignty drives her to step back from the Kantian urge to bind with international law in favour of Rawlsian consensus-building on basic principles in an agonistic global public sphere; yet she acknowledges that liberal presumptions are still present in the primacy accorded to the freedoms of speech, conscience and association underpinning that debate (246). Her Capabilities Approach is explicit in the weight it places on material circumstances and, indeed, in its theoretical commitment to global redistribution as a "moral imperative"; yet she cites research on problems of collective action, accountability, and "benevolent paternalism" as suggesting that much foreign aid is ineffective in practice, concluding that interested outsiders would do best by limiting their interventions to knowledge- and technology-sharing combined with persuasion, with a view to the non-coercive strengthening of local institutions (223-229). Additionally, with regard to the posthuman critique, her reconceptualization of the grounds of dignity suggests the extension of moral concern to sentient non-human others, a position she defends in more detail in *Frontiers of Justice*.

Another prominent theorist of normative cosmopolitanism is Kwame Anthony Appiah, whose "rooted" cosmopolitanism explicitly rejects the stereotype of the cosmopolitan as "rootless", insisting that the ethical partiality of attachment to family, friends and co-nationals is an intrinsic good that both can and should be pursued simultaneously with cosmopolitan attachment to distant others (Ethics of Identity; Cosmopolitanism). Appiah echoes the universalism and ethical individualism of Mill in starting from "the perspective of the individual engaged in making his or her life" (Ethics of Identity xvii), which sees rational revisability, the freedom to revise one's conceptions of the good in a project of self-determination, as a constitutive good of human existence. This project of self-creation, however, is not pursued in isolation but in "dialogue" with others with whom one is socially situated (13-21, 45-46).[16] There is an accompanying role for the state in promulgating visions of the good life—indeed, Appiah's position, again following Mill, is perfectionist in taking an active stance on the state's role in shaping its citizens' preferences (what he terms "soul-making", chap. 5). But this perfectionism must be compatible with individual autonomy to the extent of leaving the individual free to dissent from the state's substantive notion of the good (156-160). Appiah's cosmopolitan move is to include among the others with whom the individual is constitutively situated not just fellow nationals but all those with whom they share a planet. Related to this is also a distinction between morality and ethics, following Dworkin, in which ethics is the wider term addressing all ideas about the good life, whereas morality refers to the narrower set of ideas about how we ought to treat other people (230-232). The distinction provides the engine for Appiah's rooted cosmopolitanism (chapter 6): it supports a "mixed theory of value" enabling differentiation between the "moral" obligations owed equally to everyone *qua* humans and the larger set of "ethical" obligations owed to those with whom we are embedded in thicker relationships and whose identity-formation projects are more closely implicated in our own (233-236). Crucially, the shapes of these various identities and the obligations they entail, both local and global, remain subject to ongoing contestation and resignification: the underlying engine of (weakly) autonomous self-fashioning requires that they remain revisable, the debate open. This debate is not limited to argumentative forms of reason-giving. Appiah stresses the power of representational practices in the construction and ceaseless

[15] Robbins (Comparative Cosmopolitanisms) uses the term "discrepant cosmopolitanisms" to describe such nuanced forms.

[16] See Charles Taylor (Sources of The Self) on the "dialogic" constitution of the self amid "webs of interlocution".

renegotiation of identities and the centrality of narrative to our self-understandings. Indeed, he suggests that it is our shared grasp of narrative logic as much as our faculty of reason that unites us as human beings and justifies a cosmopolitan optimism about resolving value conflicts. Shared "moments of judgement" may be achieved without agreement across ethical divides on reasons (253). The ability to learn from one another's stories, to see from one another's perspectives, is what keeps us from falling into the defeatist silence of moral relativism (Cosmopolitanism 28-30).

A final example of a cosmopolitan critical theorist who is attentive to the claims of culture and yet insistent upon moral universalism is Seyla Benhabib. A committed feminist who has worked extensively on the situations of migrants, refugees and exiles, Benhabib is deeply suspicious of the "disembedded and disembodied subject" of Enlightenment rationality and how universalistic contractarian theories have tended to privatize the experiences and concerns of women and cultural others, excluding them from the domain of public moral discourse (Situating the Self 4-5; chap. 5). Her cosmopolitanism thus seeks to recognize not only the "generalized" but also the "concrete" other – that is, to attend to difference as well as sameness, to the physically, emotionally and culturally encumbered as well as the unencumbered self. Crucially, in contrast to communitarians and realists who tend to view morality in terms of local ethics and political power, Benhabib insists "*on the necessary disjunction as well as the necessary mediation between the moral and the ethical, the moral and the political*" (Another Cosmopolitanism 18 – italics in original; see also 157f). Cosmopolitanism lies in this field of mediation between moral universalism and ethical particularism. As in Habermas, the search is for "postmetaphysical" universal moral principles that are derived not through abstract *a priori* reasoning but through actual intersubjective deliberation between fully situated selves – what Benhabib terms "dialogic universalism" or "interactive universalism" (Another Cosmopolitanism; Situating the Self 153). Unconvinced by either the achievability or appropriateness of the standard liberal model of a "neutral" public sphere, Benhabib deploys Arendt's notion of "enlarged thinking" (a postconventional ability to inhabit other perspectives when forming judgements) to envisage a capacious and agonistic public sphere that is more welcoming of the affective and particular dimensions of human existence (Another Cosmopolitanism 165ff; Situating the Self chap. 3). It is not quite the case that anything goes, however. Benhabib describes her model as "radically proceduralist" (Situating the Self 12), reflecting its basis in the procedural universalism of Habermasian discourse ethics: while neither the content of debate nor the "semantics" of reason-giving can be restricted in advance, the principles of universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity that underpin the public sphere, enabling moral argumentation between differently situated selves, must be observed. This restriction has sharp teeth. For discourse ethicists, recognition as a "moral being" capable of "communicative reason" is achieved through the protection of "communicative freedom" ---that is, by ensuring that all individuals can challenge the rules and institutions constraining their lives through participation in public moral discourse. It is a deliberative democratic notion that, in the context of the multicultural state, restricts legal pluralism to forms that do not negatively impact an individual's civil and political rights and are consistent with voluntary self-ascription and freedom of exit (Claims of Culture 102). In an international context, it is stricter than Rawls on the basic requirements for a sovereign state to be considered "decent" in terms of its internal political organization in so far as it demands democracy.[17] For Benhabib, democratic self-governance is a human right – it is implicit in recognition as a "free and equal being" empowered to contest the legitimacy of the law to which one is subject (Dignity in Adversity 74-75, 89). She unpacks the intuition of Arendt's "right to have rights" (referring to a fundamental right not to be denaturalized, or deprived of membership in the political community that assures all other legal protections), pointing out how it gestures towards two different rights concepts: a "juridico-civil" (positive law) concept of rights guaranteed by

[17] Benhabib criticizes Rawls' *The Law of Peoples*, both for its sociologically inaccurate "holism" with regard to peoples and its inadequate protection for individual rights, for example of women and minorities (Dignity in Adversity chap.5; Rights of Others chap.3; Another Cosmopolitanism 67f).

membership of a particular community; and a "moral" human-rights concept guaranteed by membership of humanity (Rights of Others 56-7). In Benhabib's discourse ethics, such human rights are the universal moral principles that underpin communicative freedom and give it substance. Absent a world state, however, these principles are not justiciable until they have been appropriated and given specific juridical form in particular legislatures. These processes of mediation between universal and particular are the "democratic iterations" that distinguish Benhabib's cosmopolitanism: processes of deliberation and contestation in the public sphere, involving both institutional and individual actors, through which diversely situated peoples adopt universal norms into local legislatures in the creative and transformative ways needed to re-establish the relevance and meaning of each moral principle given their contingent circumstances (Rights of Others 131-133; Dignity in Adversity 72-80; Another Cosmopolitanism 47-51).

For all Benhabib's insistence on political agonism in the public sphere, there are substantial normative commitments at work in her cosmopolitanism. A constitutional commitment to human rights provides the overarching framework within which positive laws must be articulated: they are what "enable us to judge the legitimacy of the law" (Dignity in Adversity 74) and to that extent they are beyond the reach of even the democratic sovereign. Benhabib sees this "paradox of democratic legitimacy" as a constitutive feature of liberal democracy: "The democratic sovereign draws its legitimacy not merely from its act of constitution but, equally significantly, from the conformity of this act to universal principles of human rights that are in some sense said to precede and antedate the will of the sovereign and in accordance with which the sovereign undertakes to bind itself" (Another Cosmopolitanism 31; Rights of Others 43-48). At the level of the *demos*, this paradox, also termed the "co-originality thesis" (Fine 70-71), imagines universal constitutional principles retrieved and re-legitimated through the democratic process, thus sidestepping the problem (for democrats) of their natural law-flavoured priority to that process. The same logic is operative in Benhabib's democratic iterations. Yet, at the world level, faced with the political reality of contestation of human rights norms and a global democratic deficit, justifying cosmopolitan principles by appeal to an imaginary process of democratic retrieval is unconvincing, and the question of legitimacy remains to be answered.[18]

So how does Benhabib address such questions of legitimacy and respond to the charge of moral imperialism? As discussed above, her cosmopolitan norms are those of discourse ethics, entailed by the requirement of reciprocal respect for the communicative freedom of other moral beings. Benhabib argues that these normative commitments are "presupposed" in the adoption of the postconventional moral horizon of the UDHR, which recognizes all human beings as worthy of equal moral respect regardless of race, gender, or creed (Dignity in Adversity 64-72). Their "ontological status" is that of "new moral facts" that emerge with the adoption of this horizon, a corollary of the act of recognizing genocide as "the supreme crime against humanity" (Another Cosmopolitanism 72). How these moral facts are understood, however, is a matter for the local demos and fully situated dialogue: it is local democratic iterations through which they are legitimated and turned into positive law. The charge of moral imperialism is refuted by stressing contestability (all norms are potentially fallible and subject to interrogation) as well as the openness of the public sphere, including its accessibility to diverse forms of reason-giving (Situating the Self 51-54; Dignity in Adversity 12-18) For Benhabib, such a public sphere requires

[18] Note Benhabib is clear that "*the validity of cosmopolitan norms* is not dependent on jurisgenerative and democratic iterations. This validity is based on independent normative grounds" (Another Cosmopolitanism 49). The emphasis is on mediation between the normative universal and the democratic particular: democratic iterations do not generate the universal, but they "augment" its meaning by providing "new semantic contexts" through which local ownership is expressed (*ibid*). Such expressions of democratic ownership are not possible at the global level, since the logic of democratic legitimacy "requires closure" (Rights of Others 220). As in Habermas, democracy at the global level is seen as normatively undesirable or even illegitimate, since the idea of collective self-determination presumes membership of a group that distinguishes itself from others (cf. discussion in Fine, 59-63).

democracy at the nation-state level; it also presupposes commensurability across cultural divides both within and across nations. Benhabib's optimism about the possibility of intercultural dialogue rests on so-called "justificatory universalism": the belief that human reason has some minimal "normative content", or that there are context-neutral "procedures of inquiry, evidence and questioning" that ought to govern reason-giving, so that even when divergent interests push consensus out of reach there still remains a common language for engagement (Claims of Culture 27; Dignity in Adversity 10, 63). Evidently, not all reasons are equally acceptable, and even Arendtian enlarged thinking has its limits. For all its reflexivity and pluralistic recognition of "concrete" otherness, Benhabib's discourse-theoretic cosmopolitanism evinces an Enlightenment-era faith in the existence of universalistic moral facts, or shared ideals of right, that are discernible through processes of reasoned intersubjective deliberation; it is this faith that drives her robust defence of human rights against accusations of imperialism.

5. Natural law rehabilitated

Something akin to this faith in moral facts and objective reasoning is a constitutive feature of normative cosmopolitanism; cultural pluralism and discrepant values are recognized as shaping multiple valid worldviews, but they are seen as operating within a shared (human) horizon that militates against full-blown moral relativism or untranslatability. The same faith motivates the "natural law" perspective which was claimed above as a core feature of cosmopolitanism: this is the perspective that insists on looking beyond law's positivist manifestations towards its normative foundations in shared human nature, including common conceptions of the good, and the demands of practical reason if it is to be endorsed by rational agents.[19] The discomfort with natural law evinced by cosmopolitan theorists who value the hard-won achievements of political deliberation[20] springs from its metaphysical associations: Natural Law (firmly in capitals), whether or not it is explicitly the work of a divine hand, has often been seen as a kind of normative version of the laws of physics – timeless and invariant principles that, though accessible to discovery via observation and reason, operate entirely independently of human powers of apprehension (Crowe 2-3). Confidence in the existence of such principles and the inevitability of their eventual discovery is what drives the optimistic teleological vision of Kant's Perpetual Peace. In a sense, a central challenge for cosmopolitanism is to rehabilitate natural law thinking so as to slough off its ahistoricism and epistemological absolutism, while retaining enough certainty in the rationality and objectivity of moral judgement to be able to make at least some warranted claims regarding the good that remain valid across cultures.

A gesture in this direction is provided by Hilary Putnam's work on fact/value entanglement, in which he makes a series of points against the logical positivists' imposition of a rigid fact/value dichotomy and of a corollary that ethical questions are "cognitively meaningless", or subjective and so beyond the reach of rational argument about their truth (Putnam chap.1). Putnam claims that the language and empirical descriptions of science, being pursued from particular epistemic points of view, are in practice laden with values, but that this absence of an Archimedean perspective does not invalidate scientific enquiry; he further avers that questions of ethical value are similarly pursued from within particular evaluative worldviews, but again the absence of access to an absolute "truth" that is entirely independent of the observer does not invalidate the truth-aptness, for practical purposes, of value judgements (*ibid*., chaps. 2 and 6). As he puts it: "recognizing that our judgments claim objective validity and recognizing that they are shaped by a particular culture and by a particular problematic situation are not incompatible. And this is true of scientific questions as well as ethical ones" (45). The solution is to confront the inevitability of our situatedness, the pervasiveness and "indispensability" of ethical and epistemic values in our

[19] Crowe (Natural Law) provides a natural law view of why law's capacity to provide a rational guide for action requires attention to wider ethical and political contexts and is not satisfactorily explained by local convention and social recognition.

[20] See, for example, Benhabib (Another Cosmopolitanism 20ff) or Fine's criticism of Kant (*op. cit.*, chap.2).

lives, with Deweyan pragmatism, in which a sufficiently objective (meaning one that is fallible, experimental, and democratic rather than absolute) judgement of value is achieved through the practice of criticism—that is, for Dewey and for Putnam, through exposing it to the rigors of warranted assertibility (103-109; 130-132). Putnam's moral realism thus disavows absolutist claims regarding truth/objectivity and avoids teleology; there is no need to commit to some "'frozen' final truth" available in an idealized abstract from which perspective has been expunged. Truth claims in science and ethics alike require only the more modest ability "to distinguish between warranted and unwarranted judgments (including judgments of value) at least some of the time" (109). A cosmopolitanism inflected by such thinking may indeed tentatively posit the existence of moral facts, but it will do so with the humility that should characterize all critical enquiry, the humility of fallibilism.

A second move is to point out that a natural law perspective does not have to entail an ahistorical view of human nature as timeless, somehow outside of and impervious to the influences of societal and cultural change. Since its subject matter is human normativity, natural law is inevitably engaged with accounts of "the good", that is with questions of value. The goods humans are inclined to value may be explained by innate drives (for food, pleasure, companionship, etc.) and/or by more reflective dispositions (for longer-term health, reciprocity, fairness, etc.). Natural law ethics focuses on these latter dispositions, which Jonathan Crowe terms "normative inclinations": "human dispositions both to act in certain ways and to believe that the actions in question are worthwhile or required" (Crowe 20). Such values are integral to the experience of being human, but they are not biologically determined. The diversity of human societies and cultures bears witness to the plurality of ethical commitments: as Appiah puts it, our values are "responsive to, but underdetermined by, the complexities of our nature" (Experiments Loc1503-1516). Yet, following Putnam above and emphasizing the "reflective" aspect of these dispositions, the fact of value plurality does not preclude consideration of the "truth-aptness" of the beliefs surrounding a particular normative inclination: warrantability requires a reasoned defence (in terms of consistency with other credible facts and acceptable values). Even if, as experimental moral psychologists have suggested, deeply-embedded "moral emotions" play a large role in conditioning moral behaviour, Appiah points out that such naturalistic explanation does not exhaust our interest in moral decision-making: we still aspire to justification, to the reasoned endorsement of decisions (Loc 1099-1112). For Appiah, an attraction of moral philosophy (and of Aristotelian virtue theory in particular) is that it encourages us to stand back from "our own subjective evaluations, our first intuitive responses to a situation" in an ongoing project of self-fashioning that is pursued in conversation with but yet "goes beyond" our intersectional social identities (Loc 1607-1633). On this view, human nature is "cultivated" – humans as a species benefit from an "inheritance [that] is both biological and cultural", from having "brains that allow us to pick up things from one another that are not in our genes" (Appiah, Lies 122). On such a reading, being human becomes an issue of identity for the species, a project of ethical and political self-fashioning in which we have stakes both as individuals and as members of various communities, local, regional, and global.

A natural law perspective operating along precisely such lines is proposed by Crowe. He explains law as a "human artifact" which functions as "a deontic marker" through the creation of "a sense of social obligation" that is only rationally binding when a putative law is sufficiently grounded in ethical and political principles; in his conception, natural law is thus "a historically extended, socially embodied practice grounded in human nature" which seeks to imagine the "normative inclinations" that reason would endorse when the boundaries of the community are extended to include all members of the species (Crowe 12, 96-7, passim). In this picture, human nature plays a decisive role as both enabling material and evolving product of an ongoing moral conversation on the global human condition that generates implications for the regulation of behaviour across cultures. As the preceding survey of cosmopolitan theorists has demonstrated, some such normative vision can be seen at work in cosmopolitan thought very widely, even among thinkers who express hostility to natural law.

In conclusion, cosmopolitanism is an argument about how the world ought to be as well as a political project,

grounded in that normative vision, that aspires towards its practical realization. In keeping with Kant's reservations regarding world statism, cosmopolitanism remains alert to the predilection for moral imperialism that accompanies such a project; it insists on its radical self-reflexivity – on being open to contest and the possibility of transformation, committed only to those principles that can be recursively reclaimed in dialogic processes of intercultural interrogation (while being optimistic about the mutual intelligibility of such dialogue). At the same time, there can be no denying cosmopolitanism's substantive normative commitments. While dignity may be variously understood, cosmopolitanism locates the dignity that grounds duties of mutual respect firmly in the individual and insists upon the equality of that dignity. Its *sine qua non* is a postconventional moral horizon that is inherently hostile to racism, sexism, or any comparable belief system that seeks to limit concern to a subset of persons through the exclusion of those it deems "lesser" in dignity. Following the internal logic of these commitments to the moral equality of the individual and to self-reflexivity, cosmopolitanism is also opposed to all forms of authoritarianism as well as to a political realist outlook in which what is "right" is what can be enforced. Its perspective is the ethical, and its resistance to injustice, the monopolization of authority or the stifling of dissent at whatever level (household, ethnos, national, regional or world state) favours dialogue and persuasion over the leveraging of power. It is for this reason that literature and other cultural media through which its normative vision can be propagated are a central part of cosmopolitanism's armoury.

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